[1.1] rootfs: fix 'can we mount on top of /proc' check#4334
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lifubang merged 1 commit intoopencontainers:release-1.1from Jul 5, 2024
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[1.1] rootfs: fix 'can we mount on top of /proc' check#4334lifubang merged 1 commit intoopencontainers:release-1.1from
lifubang merged 1 commit intoopencontainers:release-1.1from
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(This is a cherry-pick of cdff09a but modified so that changes like 8e8b136 and a60933b don't also need to be backported. Ideally we would backport the entire "remove all mount logic from nsexec" series, but that would be a bit too much.) Our previous test for whether we can mount on top of /proc incorrectly assumed that it would only be called with bind-mount sources. This meant that having a non bind-mount entry for a pseudo-filesystem (like overlayfs) with a dummy source set to /proc on the host would let you bypass the check, which could easily lead to security issues. In addition, the check should be applied more uniformly to all mount types, so fix that as well. And add some tests for some of the tricky cases to make sure we protect against them properly. Fixes: 331692b ("Only allow proc mount if it is procfs") Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
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(Backport of a patch from #3985.)
(This is a cherry-pick of cdff09a but modified so that changes like 8e8b136 and a60933b don't also need to be backported. Ideally we would backport the entire "remove all mount logic from nsexec" series, but that would be a bit too much.)
Our previous test for whether we can mount on top of /proc incorrectly assumed that it would only be called with bind-mount sources. This meant that having a non bind-mount entry for a pseudo-filesystem (like overlayfs) with a dummy source set to /proc on the host would let you bypass the check, which could easily lead to security issues.
In addition, the check should be applied more uniformly to all mount types, so fix that as well. And add some tests for some of the tricky cases to make sure we protect against them properly.
Fixes: 331692b ("Only allow proc mount if it is procfs")
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai cyphar@cyphar.com