feat(sdm): SDM warming-refund accounting, gated by flag

[nonsense]

This PR is introducing SDM - Sequencer-Defined Metering.

Design doc: https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/design-docs/blob/main/protocol/sdm.md
Tracking issue: https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/protocol-team/issues/59

PR is heavy WIP, and ideally will be refactored further so that it is easier for review.

---

Follow-up from #19954

---

Per-commit summaries

feat(op-alloy): add post-exec (0x7D) transaction type
Hardened post-exec transaction already included in previous PR.

feat(alloy-op-evm): post-exec block executor and SDM warming inspector
Core consensus change. SDMWarmingInspector tracks first-warmer provenance
and emits refunds.

feat(op-reth): add ConfigurePostExecEvm and post-exec-aware evm config
Plumbing for op-reth

feat(op-reth): inject synthetic post-exec tx in payload builder
Appends the 0x7D tx at block tail when --rollup.sdm-enabled.

feat(op-reth): add debug_replaySDMBlock rpc and post-exec-replay crate
New reth-optimism-post-exec-replay crate re-executes a historical block under Produce and compares the synthesized payload to the embedded 0x7D and the receipt-level refund projection.

feat(op-chain-ops): add Go sdmreplay client
Go driver for debug_replaySDMBlock

test(op-acceptance-tests): add end-to-end SDM coverage
Devstack tests that boot an op-reth sequencer with SDM enabled.

feat(op-reth): add SDM observability metrics
SDM observability

---

TODO:

• simplify further and leave only mandatory changes, by extracting nice-to-have functionality and tools for future PRs.

[wiz-0f98cca50a]

Wiz Scan Summary

Scanner	Findings
Vulnerabilities	2  1  4
Sensitive Data	-
Secrets	-
IaC Misconfigurations	-
SAST Findings	1
Software Management Findings	-
Total	2  2  4

View scan details in Wiz

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[wiz-0f98cca50a]

 SAST Finding

OS Command Injection (CWE-78)

More Details

OS command injection is a critical vulnerability that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the system. This can lead to a full system compromise, as the attacker can potentially gain complete control over the application and the underlying system.

The vulnerability arises when user input is used to construct commands or command arguments that are then executed by the application. This can occur when user-supplied data is passed directly to functions that execute OS commands, such as exec.Command, exec.CommandContext, syscall.ForkExec, or syscall.StartProcess.

If an attacker can inject malicious code into these commands, they can potentially execute any command on the system, including installing malware, stealing data, or causing a denial of service. This vulnerability can have severe consequences, including data breaches, system compromise, and unauthorized access to sensitive information.

To avoid this vulnerability, user input should never be used directly in constructing commands or command arguments. Instead, the application should use a hardcoded set of arguments and validate any user input to ensure it does not contain malicious code.

Attribute	Value
Impact
Likelihood

Remediation

To remediate this vulnerability, follow these recommendations:

• Never use user-supplied input directly in constructing commands or command arguments.
• Validate and sanitize all user input before using it in any context.
• Use a hardcoded set of arguments for executing OS commands.
• If filenames are required, use a hash or unique identifier instead of the actual filename.
• Consider using a native library that implements the required functionality instead of executing OS commands.

Example of safely executing an OS command:

userData := []byte("user data")
// Create a temporary file in the application-specific directory
f, err := ioutil.TempFile("/var/app/restricted", "temp-*.dat")
if err != nil {
  log.Fatal(err)
}

if _, err := f.Write(userData); err != nil {
  log.Fatal(err)
}

if err := f.Close(); err != nil {
  log.Fatal(err)
}

// Pass the full path to the binary and the name of the temporary file
out, err := exec.Command("/bin/cat", f.Name()).Output()
if err != nil {
  log.Fatal(err)
}

Rule ID: WS-I011-GO-00026

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[codecov]

Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 66.3%. Comparing base (64dce2f) to head (b51b9bd).
⚠️ Report is 1 commits behind head on develop.

❗ There is a different number of reports uploaded between BASE (64dce2f) and HEAD (b51b9bd). Click for more details.

HEAD has 12 uploads less than BASE

Flag	BASE (64dce2f)	HEAD (b51b9bd)
contracts-bedrock-tests	12	0

Additional details and impacted files

@@            Coverage Diff             @@
##           develop   ethereum-optimism/optimism#20173     +/-   ##
==========================================
- Coverage     76.0%    66.3%   -9.7%     
==========================================
  Files          183       55    -128     
  Lines        10536     4035   -6501     
==========================================
- Hits          8012     2677   -5335     
+ Misses        2380     1214   -1166     
  Partials       144      144             

Flag	Coverage Δ
cannon-go-tests-64	66.3% <ø> (ø)
contracts-bedrock-tests	?

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see 128 files with indirect coverage changes

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